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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate tax planning, in large measure, is a function of several
variables. First, tax attorneys must examine recent pronouncements
and decisions that could affect current planning techniques. Judicial
guidance on the meaning of an Internal Revenue Code ("Code") sec-
tion, however, may come long after a client completes a transaction.'
1. For instance, in Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), qff'd, 886 F.2d
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Second, tax practitioners must constantly analyze the relevant
Code sections in structuring transactions. Yet their task is compli-
cated greatly by the flurry of congressional changes.2 Tax attorneys
must continually readjust and restructure their mergers and acquisi-
tions to satisfy the new requirements of the Code.
Third, and most important, tax attorneys must devise strategies to
minimize any tax burdens. Because the Code permits various struc-
tures for certain corporate acquisitions, in order to best serve his or
her client, the tax attorney must seize upon the alternative that ac-
complishes the desired result with imposition of the least tax, assum-
ing all non-tax considerations are equal. "[T]axpayer ingenuity,
although channeled into an effort to reduce or eliminate the incidence
of taxation, is ground for neither legal nor moral opprobrium."3 As
Judge Learned Hand so eloquently wrote, "[a]ny one may so arrange
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even
a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."4
The Internal Revenue Service ("Service") and the courts are leery
of many of the intricate and ingenious strategies employed by tax
practitioners to reduce or eliminate the incidence of taxation. In cer-
tain transactions involving corporate income tax, either a court or the
Service will recharacterize the transaction to match the perceived sub-
stance or true character of the transaction.5 Generally, four rules in-
fluence the acceptability of recharacterizations of transactions
governed by subchapter C of the Code; recharacterizations should be
complete, consistent, brief, and direct.6
In keeping with the principles of completeness, consistency, brev-
ity, and directness, the courts and the Service employ various judi-
cially-created doctrines to recharacterize or recast corporate taxpayer
1318 (7th Cir. 1989), the tax court analyzed a transaction that occurred in 1980.
Section 311(d) of the Code, as amended by the 1969 Act, governed the transaction.
That section, however, was amended in 1982 and 1984, and repealed in 1986.
2. Congress has enacted massive tax revisions in six of the last eight years: Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984); Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987); Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 3342.
3. Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), cff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
5. A recharacterization is merely the renaming or recasting of a taxpayer transac-
tion by the Service or the courts to match its perceived substance. See Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,469-70 (1935); B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.51 (5th ed. 1987); Levmore,
Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. PA.
L. REv. 1019 (1988).
6. Levmore, supra note 5, at 1020.
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maneuvers.7 As courts have reiterated numerous times, the incidence
of taxation depends upon the economic substance, and not necessarily
the form, of a transaction.8
Tax implications that arise from a transaction are not to be deter-
mined solely by the form used to transfer legal title. Rather, the
transaction must be viewed in its entirety. Each step, from the com-
mencement of the negotiation to the consummation of the deal, must
mirror the economic reality of the overall transaction. To do other-
wise would be to "exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statu-
tory provision in question of all serious purpose."9 If the substance of
the transaction conflicts with the form employed, courts will collapse
the transactions together to honor the underlying economic reality.
When should the courts respect the form of a transaction? The
Tax Court directly addressed the form versus substance issue in Es-
mark, Inc. v. Commissioner.o In that case, the court, in an opinion
authored by Judge Cohen, concluded that under Section 311(d) of the
Code, a nonrecognition provision, tax consequences would be dictated
by form. To disregard the taxpayer's compliance with Section 311(d),
the Service must demonstrate that the structure chosen by the tax-
payer was a fiction-a subterfuge-that failed to reflect the economic
reality of the transaction."' In Esmark, the court let the form of the
transaction dictate the tax treatment because there was no difference
between the form selected by Esmark and the substance alleged by
the Service.
The triumph of form over substance has obvious and important
ramifications on tax planning for current mergers and acquisitions.
This Comment will define briefly the step-transaction doctrine and
the alternative tests employed by the courts in invoking the doctrine.
Second, this Comment will outline the facts and holding of Esmark.
Third, Judge Cohen's decision will be critically analyzed, and past
court precedents will be analogized to or distinguished from Esmark.
Fourth, this Comment will highlight the statutory and judicial re-
quirements for a Section 355 split-off and recast the Esmark transac-
tion as a tax-free split-off. If Mobil-Esmark type transactions qualify
as Section 355 split-offs, the crucial question is whether that result is
proper as a matter of tax policy.
7. The courts have cited to the step-transaction doctrine, sham transaction doctrine,
continuity of interest requirements, business purpose doctrine, and various hy-
brids of the form versus substance arguments. The courts, however, have never
been consistent as to which of the several doctrines they purport to rely on in
their decisions.
8. E.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
9. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
10. 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
11. Id. at 183.
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II. STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE
Oftentimes, a business transaction, especially a complicated acqui-
sition, has no sharp beginning or clearly defined end. In practice, it is
often necessary to cut the transaction, usually chronologically, into its
constituent elements for tax treatment.1 2 If the taxpayer slices the
segments too thinly, the objective economic realities of the transaction
may not reflect the particular form the taxpayer employed.13 "[Tihe
simple expedient of drawing up papers [has never been regarded] as
controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are
to the contrary."14 If the substance contradicts the form, the tax re-
sults may be unduly harsh to the government, the taxpayer, or both.15
Consequently, "formal written documents are not rigidly bind-
ing."' 6 The step-transaction doctrine is, in effect, a corollary of sub-
12. B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 5, 14.51, at 14-175. For example, the tax-
payer may slice a multi-phase transaction into its constituent elements - a stock
purchase followed by a redemption.
13. The stock purchase and redemption, however, may more closely resemble an as-
set sale followed by a nonliquidating distribution to shareholders.
14. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)(quoting Commissioner
v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946)).
15. B. BrrrKER & J. EusrnC, supra note 5, % 14.51, at 14-175. A transaction may be
stepped together regardless whether the practical effect is imposition of, or relief
from, taxation. Kanawha Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691
(5th Cir. 1954).
Taxpayers may challenge the form of their transactions. Taxpayers may col-
lapse interim steps together if the disqualifying interim step was undertaken in
order to comply with applicable law. Rev. Rul. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68 (where a
cash payment by a domestic parent to a first tier foreign subsidiary to purchase
stock of its subsidiary is followed by the first tier subsidiary distributing to its
domestic parent an amount of money greater than the cash payment, an amount
equal to the cash payment is disregarded as a transitory step that has no federal
income tax consequences).
There remains a fundamental question whether, as a matter of tax policy, tax-
payers who freely choose the form of their transactions should be permitted to
invoke the step-transaction doctrine. Compare Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S.
126 (1947)(taxpayer permitted to disavow form of transaction) with Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940)(taxpayer bound by form of transaction). Absent the
kind of situation in Rev. Rul. 83-142,1983-2 C.B. 68, the taxpayer arguably should
be limited to the form chosen; a taxpayer should not complain his or her taxes are
too great if that form is freely chosen.
Entirely disallowing taxpayer challenges, however, misplaces the focus of the
doctrine. The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that regardless of the form
chosen by the taxpayer, the taxpayer pays the correct amount of tax given the
economic reality of the transaction.
Taxpayer challenges, however should be inapplicable under certain circum-
stances. Because of the overriding need for certainty in tax planning, the step-
transaction doctrine should be inapplicable where a taxpayer legitimately has
several options available in structuring his transaction but who, through bad ad-
vise, chooses a form that produces greater tax than some alternative form.
16. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)(quoting Helvering v. F
& R Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252,255 (1939)). See also Commissioner v. P.G. Lake,
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stance-versus-form arguments.17 "According to the doctrine, a series
of formally separate steps may be amalgamated and treated as a single
transaction if they are in substance integrated, interdependent, and
focused toward a particular end result."18 The doctrine is a potential
weapon in the Service and the courts' arsenal to recharacterize certain
taxpayer maneuvers.
A. Judicial Tests
In collapsing certain "steps" together, the courts have employed
three alternative tests. No universally accepted test as to when and
how the step-transaction doctrine should be applied to a given transac-
tion exists.
1. Binding Commitment Test
Under the binding commitment test, a series of transactions are
collapsed if, at the time the first step is entered into, there was a bind-
ing commitment to undertake the later step.19 The binding commit-
ment test is the narrowest alternative of the three tests because a
formal commitment, oftentimes reduced to writing, by the parties is
required.
Certain corporate reorganizations have been scrutinized under the
binding commitment test. The leading case is Commissioner v.
Gordon.20 In that case, Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. ("Pacific")
devised a plan to generate cash to pay off certain liabilities and meet
its capital needs. Under its plan, Pacific, a 90 percent subsidiary of
A.T.& T., transferred certain assets to Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Co. ("Northwest"), a new company, in exchange for all of
Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331,
334 (1945).
17. Invoking the step-transaction doctrine can produce two results. First, the court
may conclude that an integrated transaction must not be broken into its constitu-
ent steps or, conversely, that the separate steps must be fused together in deter-
mining the overall tax implications of the acquisition. In practice, the doctrine is
invoked most often at the request of the Service to step together formally sepa-
rate steps. B. Brrrcx & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, % 14.51, at 14-175.
18. Id. See Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415,1428 (1987); Rev. Rul. 79-250,1979-2
C.B. 156 (substance of each of a series of steps will be recognized and step-transac-
tion doctrine not applied if step has independent economic significance, is not a
sham, and was undertaken for a valid business purpose); J. FLEMING, TAX As-
PECTS OF BUYING AND SELLING CORPORATE BusINFssES § 11.02 (1984); Mintz &
Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 INST. ON FED. TAx'N
247 (1954). But cf. Rev. Rul. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68 (disregard transitory interim
steps that would disqualify an otherwise qualified reorganization where steps
taken to comply with local law).
19. E.g., Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1429 (1987).
20. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
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Northwest's common stock and debt paper.2 ' Then, in 1961 Pacific
transferred approximately 57 percent of its Northwest stock to Pacific
shareholders to pass control of Northwest to the parent company, A.T.
& T.22 Pacific offered the remainder of Northwest common stock to
Pacific shareholders in June 1963. This second transaction was simi-
larly structured, except that eight rights plus $16.00 purchased one
share of Northwest.
The Commissioner asserted deficiencies against certain minority
Pacific shareholders, contending that the taxpayers received ordinary
income in the amount of the difference between the sum paid to exer-
cise their rights and the fair market value of the stock received. The
Court upheld the taxpayers' contention that the 1961 distribution met
the requirements of Section 355 of the Code, with the result that no
gain or loss had to be recognized on the receipt by them or their exer-
cise of the rights. The Court reasoned that, "[i]f the 1961 distribution
played a part in what later proved to be a total divestiture of the
Northwest stock, it was not, in 1961, either a total divestiture or a step
in a plan of total divestiture." 23 If the first offering of rights was to be
characterized as a "first step," there must have been a binding com-
mitment to total divestiture. The Court, however, found no such bind-
ing commitment, stating that it was merely a fortuity that the
remainder of the stock had been distributed to shareholders.24
As partially evidenced by Gordon, the principal advantage of the
binding commitment test is to promote certainty in the tax planning of
shareholders. Under the binding commitment test, a court must ob-
jectively determine whether the acquired shareholders were bound by
an obligation to sell the shares received in an acquisition.25 According
to the court in Penrod v. Commissioner,26 intent by the shareholders
21. Id. at 85. Pacific transferred its telephone businesses in Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho, retaining its California operations.
22. Under this plan, Pacific distributed to its shareholders transferable rights enti-
tling their holders to purchase Northwest stock at below fair market value. Six
rights plus a $16.00 payment purchased one shard of Northwest common. Id. at
86.
23. Id. at 97-98.
24. Id. at 96-97. See United States v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc., 400 F.2d 737 (8th Cir.
1968)(where merger agreement placed former target shareholder under no obli-
gation to sell the acquiring company's stock to the other shareholders, her subse-
quent sale did not destroy the continuity of interest requirement).
25. Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1429 (1987).
26. Id. In Penrod, petitioners owned stock in a number of corporations that operated
McDonald's fast food restaurants in south Florida. In May 1975, petitioner Jack
Penrod and McDonald's executed an agreement which transferred ownership
and management of the various Penrod corporations to McDonald's in exchange
for 106,464 shares of McDonald's unregistered common stock. After registering
the McDonald's stock, petitioners sold 90 percent of the stock received. The court
concluded that, at the time of the transfer, there was no binding commitment by
the Penrods to sell their shares. Id. at 1434. The court also refused to apply the
1990]
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to sell their shares is immaterial; only an obligation binding the share-
holders to sell is considered under the binding commitment test.
The principal advantage of the binding commitment test, however,
may also be its greatest weakness. In order to promote certainty in
tax planning, the test requires a binding commitment to take the later
steps. This requirement, however, is easily manipulable by taxpayers.
Many taxpayers, as in Gordon, could devise strategies of total divesti-
ture just short of a binding commitment to that end or, as in Penrod,
could take precautions to ensure the sale after the acquisition without
making a binding commitment to sell.
2. End-Result Test
In contrast to the narrowness of the binding commitment test, the
end-result test is the most far-reaching alternative. Under the end-
result test, the step-transaction doctrine applies if the series of for-
mally separate steps are, in essence, "prearranged parts of a single
transaction intended from the outset to reach the ultimate result."27
Unlike the binding commitment test, the end-result test is premised
on the parties' actual intent as of the date of the merger or
acquisition.2 s
Because the test requires a court to make a factual determination
as to the taxpayer's intent, the test promotes uncertainty and thus im-
pedes effective tax planning.29 Courts must second-guess the tax-
payer's intent at the outset of the transaction. Such an endeavor is
hardly conducive to effective planning.
In direct contrast to the binding commitment test, however, the
end-result test is largely flexible. Rather than requiring a party to be
bound to take the later steps, the end-result test bases tax conse-
quences on the real substance of the transaction - what the parties
intended to accomplish through a series of formally separate steps.
For example, in Heintz v. Commissioner,30 the taxpayers owned
stock in Jack & Heintz, an ammunition manufacturer during World
War II. At the war's end, Precision Corp. was formed to acquire Jack
& Heintz and to reorganize its production for peacetime. Precision
purchased nearly all of the outstanding shares for $5 million in cash
and 60,000 shares of $50 par value preferred Precision stock. During
the negotiations, the buyer's parties assured the taxpayers that the
Precision shares to be received by them as partial payment would be
step-transaction doctrine under either the interdependence or the end-result
tests.
27. Id. at 1429 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 1430. Presumably, the court will determine the subjective intent of the
parties as of the date of the merger or acquisition.
29. Id.
30. 25 T.C. 132 (1955).
[Vol. 69:"/28
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sold in a public offering planned for thirty days after the merger. The
parties, however, sold their stock for $30 per share at a private sale. In
applying the step-transaction doctrine, the court focused upon the tax-
payers' wish to "cash out" their investment in Jack & Heintz, and the
acquisition was a step toward that objective.31 Thus, the court held
the reorganization failed the continuity of interest requirement.
3. Interdependence Test
The third alternative is the interdependence test. Whereas the
end-result test focuses on the outcome, the interdependence test
stresses the relationship between the individual steps.32 This test asks
"whether the individual steps in a series had independent significance
or whether they had meaning only as part of the larger transaction."33
It focuses upon whether "the steps are so interdependent that the
legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless
without a completion of the series."3 4 Thus, the step-transaction doc-
trine may be applied whenever it is unlikely that any one step would
have been undertaken except in contemplation of the other integrat-
ing steps.3 5
Under the interdependence test, the court in Security Industrial
Insurance Co. v. United States,36 examined whether each step had a
separate, reasoned economic justification. In denying the corporation
and its shareholders "'F" reorganization status, the court found the
transfers of assets from Southern and Standard to Security were nec-
essary to effectuate the reinsurance agreements with Security.37 Such
complicated interrelationships demonstrated that each step in the
transaction led inexorably to the next. Thus, such a symbiotic rela-
tionship satisfied the interdependence test for application of the step-
31. Id. at 142-43.
32. Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2 1234, 1246-47 (5th Cir. 1983);
McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982); Pen-
rod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1430 (1987).
33. Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 124 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 913 (1981); King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Cl. Ct.
1969) (quoting Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAxATION 200,254 (1938)). See Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415,1430 (1987);
Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), ff'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); Farr v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 350 (1955); American Wire Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 607 (1951); American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948),
uIff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
35. Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1976).
36. 702 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1983).
37. The Security Indus. Ins. Co. transaction occurred prior to congressional amend-
ments to LR.C. § 368(a)(1)(F), limiting "F" reorganizations to one corporation.
Thus, at the time of the transaction an 'TF' reorganization could legally include
more than one corporation.
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transaction doctrine.38
B. Critique
Unfortunately, these three tests - binding commitment, end-re-
sult, and interdependence - "are notably abstruse - even for such an
abstruse field as tax law."39 Because no test is universally accepted,
applications of the step-transaction doctrine have been enigmatic.
For example, the Supreme Court's enunciation of the binding com-
mitment test in Gordon, which telescopes several steps into one only if
a binding commitment existed as to the second step when the first
step was taken, has been limited to the facts of that case. Subsequent
decisions have held that Gordon does not contain the slightest indica-
tion that the binding commitment requirement is the touchstone of
the step transaction doctrine.40 As one court noted, the step transac-
tion doctrine would be a "dead letter if restricted to situations where
the parties were bound to take certain steps."41
Thus, courts most often will amalgamate purportedly separate
steps into a single transaction if the end-result or the interdependence
tests are satisfied. In multi-phase transactions, both the end-result
and interdependence tests ensure that the tax consequences of a given
transaction turn on substance rather than form.4 2 In contrast, the
binding commitment test may effectively permit taxpayers to evade
the step-transaction doctrine merely by abstaining from formal com-
mitments even though that may fly in the face of the parties' actual
intent and economic reality.
C. Application
With the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine in place, this
Comment examines the application of the doctrine to various fact pat-
terns. Several landmark cases nicely illustrate when courts are will-
ing to respect the form of the transaction. There are six types of
situations when form versus substance analysis will be addressed.43
The first situation is straightforward: a taxpayer's transaction takes a
38. Id. at 1247. The court also applied the step-transaction doctrine under the end-
result test.
39. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450
U.S. 913 (1981).
40. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518 (Cl. Ct. 1969).
41. Id.
42. Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1245 (6th Cir. 1983).
43. The following table illustrates the six types of situations in which either the tax-
payer or the Service may attempt to use the step-transaction doctrine. For pur-
poses of this table, assume that the form of the transaction is "A". Form "A"
refers to the form adopted by the parties, which form may or may not reflect the
substance of the transaction. In contrast, "B" represents the economic substance
of the transaction if the form ("A") does not represent the substance. However,
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particular form and reflects its substance. The form is respected be-
cause both form and substance match.
In the second type of situation, form and substance do not match.
In Helvering v. F & R Lazarus & Co.,44 a corporate taxpayer succeeded
in having its sale-leaseback of certain real property recharacterized as
a loan. In the transaction, the taxpayer purported to convey owner-
ship of the real property to the trustee bank. The rent stipulated in
the lease was intended as a promise to pay interest on the loan. Thus,
the deed was in substance a mortgage executed as security.
The third type of situation involves transactions which may be
characterized in substance as either the form adopted by the parties or
an alternative form. Because no substance alternative is better than
the other, the court should honor the form chosen by the taxpayer. As
will be shown, this type of situation is markedly similar to Esmark,
Inc. v. Commissioner.45 In a taxpayer challenge, however, the court
should not permit a taxpayer, who through bad advise or otherwise
chose a form that produced a greater tax, to argue for a different and
less expensive form.
"B" may or may not be the preferred substance alternative, that is, the best ex-
planation of what in fact occurred.
Result if.
Substance Preferred Business Service Taxpayer
of the Substance Purpose Challenges Challenges
Transaction Alternative Form Form
A A N/A Form Form
Controls Controls
B B N/A Substance Substance
Controls Controlsb
A or B A or B N/A Form Form
Controls Controls
A or B A N/A Form Form
Controls Controls
A or B B Yes Form Form
Controls Controls
A or B B No Substance Form
Controls Controls'
'Business purpose is not applicable for taxpayer challenges.
bHowever, there is contrary authority stating that a taxpayer dissatisfied with the form
chosen cannot argue for a different form. See supra note 15. Yet that is precisely what
the court allowed in Helvering v. F & R Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (1939). See infra text
accompanying note 44.
cIf the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the tax consequences of his chosen form, he should
not be allowed to complain about that form if it is one of the preferred substance
alternatives. See supra note 15. See also infra text accompanying note 47.
The above table is based on a table in Moore, Form v. Substance: When Will
Courts Respect the Form of a Transaction?, 66 J. TAX'N 66, 67 (1987).
44. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
45. 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
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The fourth type of situation is similar to the first type of situation,
except here the substance of the transaction could also be an alterna-
tive form. That alternative form, however, is not the preferred choice.
Because the form adopted by the parties is the better alternative, in
either an IRS challenge or taxpayer challenge, the taxpayer's form
should control the tax consequences.
In the fifth type of situation, the preferred substance alternative is
not the form chosen by the taxpayer, but a valid business purpose ex-
ists for choosing the taxpayer's form. For example, in Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States,46 the taxpayer originally sought financing for a pro-
posed bank facility by a conventional mortgage loan on the new build-
ing; state and federal banking regulations, however, restricted
investment in banking premises for any amount in excess of the
bank's capital stock or forty percent of its capital stock and surplus.
Because the Federal Reserve Bank rejected the taxpayer's plan, the
taxpayer structured the transaction as a sale-leaseback. The sub-
stance of the transaction, however, more closely resembled a loan than
a sale-leaseback. The Court respected the form chosen by the tax-
payer, noting that business or regulatory realities and non-tax con-
cerns compelled the taxpayer to cast the transaction as a sale-
leaseback.
Finally, the sixth type of situation involves a transaction cast one
way even though the preferred substance alternative is different. Un-
like the fifth type of situation represented in Frank Lyon, no business
purpose exists for choosing the form selected. Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co. ,47 represents this type of situation. In Court Holding, a
corporate taxpayer transferred an apartment building, the corpora-
tion's sole asset, in a liquidating distribution to the corporation's two
shareholders. The shareholders subsequently sold the apartment
building. The U.S. Supreme Court recharacterized the distribution as
a sale by the corporation and a distribution of the sale proceeds to its
shareholders. Due to the substantial involvement by the corporation
in the sale, the substance of the transaction more closely resembled a
sale by the corporation. The Court justified its recharacterization on
the lack of any business purpose for the selected form, except tax
avoidance. If, however, the taxpayer challenges the form in that situa-
tion, the taxpayer's chosen form should control. This result prevents
the sort of abuse feared by the courts.
III. ESMARI INC. V. COMMISSIONER
A. Mobil-Esmark Exchange
Against this backdrop of judicial decisions synthesizing the stan-
46. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
47. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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dards used in the step-transaction doctrine, the Tax Court decided Es-
mark, Inc. v. Commisioner.48 Esmark, Inc. was a large publicly
owned holding company,49 trading stock on the New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE"). At the time of the transaction, Esmark conducted
business through its five subsidiaries. The five subsidiaries were: (1)
Swift & Co., a packager and distributor of fresh meats and processed
foods; (2) Estech, Inc., a producer of chemical and industrial products;
(3) International Playtex, Inc., a manufacturer and distributor of fe-
male hygiene products; (4) STP Corporation, a manufacturer and dis-
tributor of automotive products; and (5) Vickers Energy Corporation
("Vickers"), a developer of energy properties and a producer of petro-
leum products. Historically, however, Esmark has been associated pri-
marily with Swift & Co., its longest standing business.
With respect to the energy division, Vickers, a holding company
consisted of its three principal operating subsidiaries: Vickers Petro-
leum, Inc. ('PC"), Doric Petroleum, Inc. ("Doric"), and TransOcean
Oil, Inc. ("TransOcean"). 50 The market value of Esmark's energy as-
sets had appreciated greatly.
During 1979 and early 1980, however, Esmark experienced finan-
cial problems. Esmark faced a serious liquidity problem due, in large
measure, to the sharp rise in crude oil prices, the continued poor per-
formance of Swift & Co., record high short-term interest rates, and an
agreement to buy Tridan Corporation assets for $45 Million. Esmark
management also believed that Esmark shares were greatly underval-
ued. Shares traded on the NYSE ranged from $23.75 and $35.50 per
share during the twelve months prior to April 1980. Management,
however, determined that the breakup value of the company's sepa-
rate assets was between $55 to $71 per share, more than twice the
$25.50 per share closing price on April 24, 1980.51 The disparity or
spread between the trading value and breakup value, the management
feared, made the company ripe for a takeover.
Thus, Esmark needed to generate cash, reduce its long-term debts,
and expand its consumer products and chemical subsidiaries. "To cap-
italize on the current interest in oil-producing property and reserves
and to rid itself of an operation that would require huge investments
for exploration and development, Esmark announced plans to auction
off its entire energy unit."5 2 In June 1980, the board of directors fi-
48. 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
49. Before Esmark's restructuring program, approximately 48,000 shareholders held
20,311,000 shares. After restructuring, however, approximately 33,900 sharehold-
ers held only 10,083,000 shares. Id. at 179.
50. Id. at 172-73. Pursuant to other agreements, Esmark sold Doric for $26.5 million
and VPC for $245 million. Thus, Vickers' sole asset was TransOcean stock.
51. Id. at 173.
52. Axelrod, Esmarks Taz-Free Disposition of a Subsidiary: Too Good to be True, 9
J. CORP. TAX'N 232, 234 (1982).
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nally approved a restructuring program which included closing certain
units of Swift & Co., disposing of certain minor businesses, disposing
of the entire energy division, and redeeming approximately 50 percent
of its stock if the energy segment was sold for cash. Because the en-
ergy division was a large ongoing business of Esmark that required
large working and investment capital, an accompanying redemption
was necessary to avoid making Esmark a prime takeover target.
After deciding that the tender offer/redemption formatm was the
best structure for the transaction, Esmark conducted a bidding contest
based on that format. In August 1980, Esmark and Mobil (the winning
bidder) entered into a formal exchange agreement. Under the agree-
ment, Mobil agreed to make a best efforts tender offer for 11,918,333
shares (approximately 54 percent) at $60 per share, and Esmark
agreed to redeem that stock for 975 shares (97.5 percent) of Vickers
stock.54 If Mobil was unable to acquire enough Esmark shares to ef-
fect an exchange for 975 Vickers shares, Mobil had an option to
purchase the balance of the 975 shares at a price of $733,435.90 per
share. On October 3, 1980, Mobil successfully completed the tender
offer and exchanged its Esmark shares for the Vickers shares.
Under the tender offer/redemption plan, Esmark contended that
the redemption of Mobil's interest would not invite taxation to Es-
mark on the inherent gain. Esmark complied with the literal require-
ments in Section 311(d)(2) of the Code-5 that exempted from
53. A tender offer/redemption plan refers to a plan whereby the acquiring corpora-
tion purchases a fixed percentage of target's stock equal to the value of the de-
sired target asset. Subsequently the acquiring corporation will exchange its
target stock for the target's assets. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171
(1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 177-78. The parties agreed to an exchange rate of 12,224 Esmark shares for
one share of Vickers. Esmark also agreed to transfer the remaining 25 shares (2.5
percent) of Vickers stock to Mobil-TransOcean, Mobil's wholly-owned subsidiary-
assignee, in exchange for a 10 percent net profits royalty interest in certain non-
producing TransOcean properties.
55. IR.C. § 311(d)(2)(repealed 1986). Section 311(d) formerly provided-
(1) In general. If -
(A) a corporation distributes property (other than an obligation of
such corporation) to a shareholder in a redemption (to which subpart
A applies) of part or all of his stock in such corporation, and
(B) the fair market value of such property exceeds its adjusted basis
(in the hands of the distributing corporation), then a gain shall be
recognized to the distributing corporation in an amount equal to such
excess as if the property distributed had been sold at the time of the
distribution. Subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to any distribu-
tion to which this subsection applies.
(2) Exceptions and Limitations. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to -...
(B) a distribution of stock or an obligation of a corporation -
(i) which is engaged in at least one trade or business,
(ii) which has not received property constituting a substantial
part of its assets from the distributing corporation, in a transac-
tion to which section 351 applied or as a contribution to capital,
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corporate taxation certain distributions of appreciated property of
long-standing subsidiaries with respect to stock. The Service, how-
ever, viewed the transaction differently; it recast the transaction as a
sale of the Vickers stock to Mobil, followed by a redemption of Es-
mark stock for cash.5 6 Under the Service's recharacterization, Es-
mark faced a potential long-term gain exceeding $452 million and a
resultant tax liability of approximately $115 million.5 7
The Service did not prevail. The Tax Court dismissed every argu-
ment by the Service to support its position and upheld the taxpayer's
form and characterization. Critical to the Tax Court's analysis were
arguments based on the nature of Mobil's ownership and the step-
transaction doctrine. In order to evaluate the Tax Court's decision
fully, this Comment will carefully analyze each issue.
B. Nature of Mobil's Ownership
As a threshold issue, Esmark had to demonstrate that Mobil was a
within the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution,
and
(iii) at least 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of
which is owned by the distributing corporation at any time
within the 9-year period ending one year before the date of the
distribution.
56. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 172 (1988), qff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989). Pursuant to its procedures, the Service refused to issue an advance
ruling on the transaction. See Rev. Proc. 82-22, 1982-1 C.B. 469.
57. The effect of the transaction at the shareholder level is, of course, a separate issue
from the imposition of tax at the corporate level. If Esmark's form was upheld,
the tendering shareholders would receive capital gains treatment on the ex-
change as if they sold their interests on the open market. If, however, the Ser-
vice's recharacterization was upheld, the tendering non-corporate shareholders
would be subjected to the general distribution rules under LR.C. § 301. Pursuant
to Section 302, a redeemed shareholder will receive exchange treatment if the
redemption was (1) not essentially equivalent to a dividend, (2) substantially dis-
proportionate with respect to the shareholder, or (3) in complete liquidation of
the shareholder's interest after applying the attribution rules under Section 318.
I.R.C. § 302 (1982).
In Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92, the Service determined a minority share-
holder of a publicly held corporation whose relative stock interest in the redeem-
ing corporation is minimal and who exercises no control over the corporation's
affairs, will qualify under Section 302(b)(1) as not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend, if the redemption resulted in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's
proportionate interest in the corporation. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301
(1970); Rev. Rul. 81-289, 1981-2 C. B. 82 (redemption of a shareholder that owned
less than one percent of publicly held corporation did not qualify as not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend because shareholder's pro rata interest not re-
duced).
Even if no meaningful reduction occurred, redeeming shareholders of a pub-
licly held corporation, such as Esmark, should be afforded exchange treatment
upon tendering their shares. The Esmark shareholders could have sold their
stock through the open market and guaranteed exchange treatment.
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shareholder who received a distribution with respect to its stock for
purposes of Section 311(a) of the Code. If Mobil was not a share-
holder, then Section 311 was inapplicable because Section 311 distribu-
tions must be made by reason of the corporation-shareholder
relationship.5 8 Even though Section 311(d)(2)(B),59 on which Esmark
relied, did not draw any distinction between "historical" and "transi-
tory" shareholders, the Service could disregard Mobil's ownership of
Esmark stock if it was merely incidental to the transaction, that is, the
substance of the transaction did not match its form.
As to the nature of Mobil's ownership, the Tax Court focused on
whether Mobil's ownership was merely transitory, whether Mobil pos-
sessed enough ownership attributes to compel a finding that it owned
the Esmark shares (albeit for less than a day), and whether Mobil ac-
ted as a conduit for the true owner.
1. Prior Precedent
Mobil's acquisition of Esmark stock followed by a prearranged sur-
render of that stock in exchange for property suddenly catapulted into
the limelight two Tax Court decisions that reached opposite conclu-
sions on the viability of this tax planning technique.60 In pressing its
transitory ownership analysis, the Service stressed the Tax Court deci-
sion in Idol v. Commissioner.6' In that case, the sole shareholder of a
trucking business needed to generate cash to pay his personal debts.
Attempting to withdraw cash from the corporation as capital gain
rather than as a dividend, the shareholder sold approximately one-
third of his shares. The purchaser redeemed the shares that same day
for the corporation's Detroit franchise and certain equipment. Under
the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") rules on competition,
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.311-2(a) provided that the exceptions and limitations to the appli-
cation of Section 311(d)(1) contained in Section 311(d)(2) do not broaden "the
general nonrecognition provisions of Section 311(a). Thus, for example, if the
proceeds of the sale of property in form made by a shareholder, who received
such property from a corporation, are imputed to the corporation ... the excep-
tions and limitations of Section 311(d)(2) would have no application."
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. Idol v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 444 (1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1953)(prear-
ranged sale of stock coupled with prearranged redemption recast as a sale of as-
sets followed by a distribution); Standard Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 1 (1959)(stock purchase and redemption respected).
61. 38 T.C. 444 (1962), ffl'd, 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963). The Service also relied on
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938)(a corporation that participated in the
reorganization of its competitors into a new corporation, of which it became 100
percent owner of preferred shares and 57 percent owner of common shares, held
"not a party to a reorganization," and thus gain on receipt of other property was
taxable to it), and United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1961) (a corporation that transferred assets to a major shareholder in redemption
of stock and then reacquired the same assets denied a step up in basis).
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the stock purchase was illegal without ICC approval. The ICC re-
duced the scope of the franchise being sold and limited the operating
rights requested by the purchaser. The parties notified the ICC that
the stock purchase was not real and was being done solely to minimize
federal income taxes.
In recasting the stock purchase and redemption as a cash sale, the
court held the transaction should be treated and taxed as a sale by the
corporation of certain of its assets to the purchaser, followed by a divi-
dend distribution of the sales proceeds to the taxpayer. The court
stated:
Not only is it plain from the evidence.., that... [the purchaser] had no
interest in acquiring any of [the corporation's] stock, but there is no indication
here that Idol had any real desire to dispose of any part of his 42 [sic] shares of
the corporation's stock. The only reason the transactions were cast in the
form of a sale of stock followed by a redemption was the possibility of ob-
taining favorable tax treatment.
[0]n its face the transitory registration of stock ownership in the name of
... [the purchaser] followed by registration in the name of... [the distributing
corporation] and accompanied by a shifting of stock certificates representing
32 shares ... formally complies with the requirements of a stock redemption
* . . and look-- like a "complete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder." The essential difficulties with this contention re-
sult from the absence of record evidence tending to indicate that... [the pur-
chaser] not only formally but in substance became the owner, for tax
purposes, of 32 shares of... [the distributing corporation's] stock, and that the
corporation actually intended to and did redeem those shares.62
Conversely, the Tax Court, under an unmistakably similar fact pat-
tern, respected the form of a prearranged sale of stock followed by a
redemption in Standard Linen Service, Inc. v. Commissioner.63 In
that case, the Model Laundry Co. ("Model") engaged in the laundry
and linen supply businesses. Model's wholly-owned subsidiary, Stan-
dard Linen Service ("Standard"), operated a separate linen supply
business. After Model experienced liquidity problems, several Model
shareholders decided to sell their stock (approximately 51 percent of
the total outstanding issues) and terminate their investment. A poten-
tial purchaser, Alsco, only wished to acquire specific assets used in
Model and Standard's linen supply businesses. Motivated in part by
tax savings, the Model shareholders desired a stock sale rather than
an asset sale. Alsco agreed to acquire Model stock from the sharehold-
ers at a price equal to the value of the linen supply assets. Pursuant to
their agreement, Model liquidated Standard and redeemed the pur-
chaser's newly acquired stock with the linen supply assets. The ex-
change occurred on the same day that Alsco acquired the Model stock.
62. Idol v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 444,460 (1962), qff'd, 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963)(ci-
tations omitted).
63. 33 T.C. 1 (1959).
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In attempting to determine the substance of what occurred, the
court noted the transaction accomplished three distinct objectives:
First, those of Model's stockholders who desired to do so were able to dis-
pose of their individual stock interests in the corporation. Second, Model dis-
posed of the linen supply part of its business, thus raising needed capital with
which to liquidate existing obligations and underwrite its plans for future ex-
pansion of the remaining laundry business. Third, Alsco acquired Model's
much wanted linen supply assets, thereby entering the linen supply busi-
ness.... Consequently, the substance of what occurred conceivably can very
well differ depending on the position from which the transactions are
viewed.6
4
The court respected the form of the transaction because the taxpayer's
form reflected the economic substance of the transaction. The selling
shareholders constantly refused to sell anything but stock and the cor-
poration never offered to sell its assets directly. Consequently, the
court honored the steps taken, even though Alsco's stock ownership
lasted for less than a day.
At first glance, these two decisions seem irreconcilable. In both,
the buyer purchased stock and, on the same day, redeemed its stock
for certain corporate assets. In Idol, the court recast the transaction
and taxed the corporation on any gain from the sale.6w In Standard
Linen, however, the court respected the form as a sale of stock fol-
lowed by a partial liquidation. 66
In discussing the apparent conflict between Idol and Standard
Linen, the Esmark court determined that Idol was only superficially
similar to Standard Linen. Esmark noted that Idol essentially in-
volved an "earnings bailout." In Idol, the sole shareholder used his
corporation as his own "personal pocketbook."67 The only corporate
change due to the transaction was that the purchaser acquired the
needed Detroit franchise and certain business equipment. Idol, how-
ever, continued to hold 100 percent of the corporation's stock, and the
business remained intact.68
In contrast, the transaction in Standard Linen fundamentally
64. Id. at 12-13.
65. Additionally, Idol held the distribution of the sale proceeds constituted a dividend
to Idol, the sole shareholder. Idol v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 444, 462 (1962), aff'd,
319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963). If Idol met one of the requirements of Section 302(b),
the redemption would be accorded capital gains treatment. Taxation of the re-
demption received by Idol, however, is a separate issue from whether the transac-
tion is taxable to the corporation for purposes of this Comment.
66. Because Standard Linen was decided under the 1939 Code, no capital gains tax
was imposed on Model for the distribution of appreciated assets.
67. Sheppard, Esmark v. Commissioner. Of Form and Substance and Aesthetics, 38
TAX NOTEs 1165, 1168 (Mar. 14, 1988).
68. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 190 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989). Before the transaction in Idol, Idol owned 90 shares (100 percent).
After the transaction, Idol owned all 58 shares outstanding. The only difference
being that the corporation no longer owned the Detroit franchise and certain
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changed the ownership of the corporation. As a direct result of the
transaction, Model disposed of its entire linen supply business. This
disposition served important corporate, as well as shareholder, pur-
poses. With respect to the corporation, Model retired the 45,476 shares
received from Alsco. Before the transaction, Model had 61,795 shares
of stock outstanding, after the transaction, it had reduced its outstand-
ing stock to 16,319 shares.69 Thus, Model had a valid non-tax motiva-
tion in structuring the transaction as it did.
With respect to the Model shareholders who tendered their shares
to Alsco, they primarily wanted to cash out their investment and not
maintain a proprietary interest in the company. Their desire to sell
their stock, and not tax savings alone, was the prime reason the trans-
action took the form it did. As the court concluded, "[r]eal rights and
liabilities were created by virtue of the exchanges which... cannot be
ignored."70
Thus, because Idol did not involve a fundamental shift in the own-
ership of the corporation, a recharacterization was justifiable. Stan-
dard Linen, however, involved the termination or reduction of
proprietary interests in the company, and thus a recharacterization
was inappropriate.
After distinguishing Idol from Standard Linen, the Esmark court
distinguished itself from Idol and subsequently compared itself to
Standard Linen. In stressing the similarities between Mobil-Esmark's
exchange and Alsco-Model's exchange, the Esmark court stated:
In this case and in Standard Linen, but not in Idol, the transaction substan-
tially changed the ownership of the corporation. In this case and in Standard
Linen, again in contrast to Idol, the transaction resulted in the disposition of
an entire line of business. Finally, in this case and in Standard Linen, unlike
in Idol, the transaction served important corporate, as well as shareholder,
purposes.
7 1
In both Standard Linen and Esmark, the corporations significantly
contracted their businesses; Model no longer was in the linen supply
business, and Esmark no longer owned an energy business. Addition-
ally, a large percentage of shareholders terminated their interests in
the companies by surrendering their shares of their own volition in a
public tender.72
equipment Because the corporation was not completely liquidated, the corpora-
tion continued to conduct its trucking business.
69. Standard Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1, 13 (1959).
70. Id. at 14.
71. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 192 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989).
72. In Standard Linen, approximately 51 percent of the shareholders tendered, while
in Esnark approximately 54 percent tendered.
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2. Potential Distinctions
Although the Esmark court concluded that the Mobil-Esmark ex-
change resembled the Alsco-Model exchange, several possible
problems still lurk in the background for taxpayers seeking to struc-
ture Mobil-Esmark type transactions. First and foremost, a Mobil-Es-
mark type transaction is taxable at the corporate level because
Congress amended Section 311(d), removing the nonrecognition ex-
emption that protected the distributing corporation.73
Second, the impetus for the transaction is a controlling factor in
the court's analysis of whether to recharacterize the transaction as a
sale of assets. Paramount to the result in Standard Linen was the
court's reasoning that the underlying purpose that gave rise to the
transaction - the shareholders' desire to terminate their interests or
the corporation's intent to dispose of assets - controls the tax conse-
quences. If the corporation initiated the transaction, the Service could
recharacterize the transaction as a sale of assets by the corporation
regardless whether the subsequent redemption qualified for capital
gains treatment under Section 302.74 If, however, the court deter-
mined that the shareholders' desire to sell their shares was the critical
factor in shaping the transaction, then no corporate tax should be
imposed.75
The Esmark shareholders, unlike the shareholders in Standard
Linen, did not participate in the transaction other than to tender their
shares. Esmark unveiled the tender offer plan to its shareholders only
after Mobil won the bidding to acquire TransOcean. Esmark faced a
liquidity crisis and unilaterally decided to sell Vickers. The share-
holders' desire to terminate their interests did not arise until after the
tender offer was initiated with Esmark management's blessings.
Thus, Esmark's corporate objective to sell its energy assets may have
been sufficient to support the Service's recharacterization.
The third concern involves the distinction between Idol and Stan-
dard Linen. Prior to Revenue Ruling 80-221,76 the Service publicly
accepted the fundamental change in ownership theory, justifying the
differing results in Idol and Standard Linen.77 In 1980, however, the
Service noted additional factors justifying its recharacterization in
73. See supra note 55.
74. For a discussion on Section 302 exchange treatment, see supra note 57. In Wal-
tham Netoco Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 401 F.2d 333 (1st Cir. 1958), the
court found the requisite corporate intention to sell assets, and thus imposed a
corporate tax on the distributing corporation.
75. Standard Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1, 13-14 (1959). See also
Master Eagle Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9171
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. Rev. Rul. 80-221, 1980-2 C.B. 107.
77. Standard Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1 (1959), acq. 1960-2 C.B.7.
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Idol. In Revenue Ruling 80-221, the Service recharacterized a stock
purchase followed by a redemption as a sale of assets. In that ruling,
the seller's proportionate interest in the corporation remained identi-
cal. Thus, the suggested rationale for recharacterizing the transaction
in Idol was present. The Service, however, held that the transaction
was structured as a stock purchase primarily for tax avoidance pur-
poses, and that the buyer's stock ownership was transitory, was never
intended to represent a normal shareholder interest, and involved
only a right to receive the desired assets in the immediate future.
If these other factors justify the opposite results in Idol and Stan-
dard Linen, and not the shift in ownership of the entity, Mobil-Es-
mark type transactions are still subject to attack because such
transactions arguably are structured for tax avoidance purposes. As
the Esmark court noted, "The expected tax benefits were.., the most
important reason for selection of the tender offer/redemption for-
mat." 8 Thus, under the Service's rationale, Esmark's tax avoidance
purposes justified the recharacterization, even though a structural
change in ownership occurred.
Besides tax savings, the Tax Court found valid business purposes
for the form of the transaction. First, as previously mentioned, Es-
mark rid itself of a large ongoing energy business that required large
sums of capital, and redeemed approximately 50 percent of its shares.
Second, a stock purchase maximized shareholders' returns; Esmark
never ruled out a cash sale if that would net the highest return for
shareholders. 79 Third, because a third party tendered rather than a
self-tender, Esmark eliminated its requirement to obtain a fair price
for the tender.0
A fourth possible problem for taxpayers structuring Mobil-Esmark
type transaction is whether an agreement to exchange was in place
before the tender offer. In these instances, the Service concluded that,
on facts similar to Standard Linen and Esmark, the transaction would
be recharacterized as a sale of the subsidiary (or its assets) by the par-
ent corporation for cash followed by a redemption of shareholders.81
78. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 176 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989).
79. Id. at 177.
80. In a self-tender, Esmark would be duty-bound to pay a fair price to its tendering
shareholders. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)(in
a cash-out merger the parent must disclose all critical information pertaining to
what it considers a fair price). Otherwise the minority shareholders may receive
their appraisal rights. In the case of a third party tender, no such requirement
exists. One commentator dismissed this business purpose as believable but of lit-
tile importance, concluding that a fairness opinion would be considerably less than
the $115 million in taxes saved. Sheppard, supra note 67, at 1168.
81. Rev. Rul. 83-38,1983-1 C.B. 76 (nonrecognition provision applies only to transfers
that are made in a corporation-shareholder relationship).
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In that ruling, which was issued after litigation in Esmark began, the
Service disregarded the acquiring company's shareholder status.
Under the Service's analysis, the acquirer agreed to purchase the par-
ent's shares as a means of settling its obligation with the parent com-
pany and not within the corporation-shareholder relationship.
In Esmark, Mobil and Esmark formally agreed before the tender
offer that Mobil would acquire enough Esmark shares to effect an ex-
change for 975 Vickers shares. Although Esmark and Mobil's formal
exchange agreement would justify a recharacterization under Reve-
nue Ruling 83-38, the Esmark court rejected that argument, emphasiz-
ing the similarity with Standard Linen's exchange and the Service's
longstanding acquiescence at the time of the transaction.8 2
3. Mobil's Attributes of Ownership
The court also quickly dismissed the Service's argument that Mobil
lacked the attributes of ownership, posing a rhetorical question: "if not
Mobil, then who?"8 3 The tendering public shareholders surrendered
all incidents of ownership upon the closing of the tender offer; they
could no longer vote their shares, receive dividends, or sell to anyone
else. The court concluded that only Mobil enjoyed the right to receive
dividends, one of the most important attributes of stock ownership.8 4
Thus, Mobil truly owned the Esmark shares and was not merely an
intermediary, a conduit for the true owner.
C. Step Transactions
After concluding that Mobil's ownership was real and substantial,
and not merely transitory, the court turned its attention to the step-
transaction doctrine. In its inquiry, the court addressed whether the
doctrine - however applied to the Mobil-Esmark exchange - could
compel disregarding Mobil's ownership of the Esmark shares. If appli-
cable, the doctrine would treat "a series of formally separate 'steps' as
a single transaction if such steps are in substance integrated, interde-
pendent, and focused toward a particular result."8
82. Standard Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1 (1959), acq. 1960-2 C.B. 7.
83. Zonona, Form Over Substance, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 1988, at 5, col. 2. Specifically,
the court said, "In claiming that Mobil was not a shareholder upon purchasing
petitioner's shares pursuant to the tender offer, respondent fails to identify any-
one other than Mobil as the 'true owner' of the shares." Esmark, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 90 T.C. 171, 193 (1988), ffld, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
84. If, however, one treats the Esmark stock held momentarily by Mobil as being
reacquired by Esmark, then the right to receive dividends adds nothing to the
analysis. Furthermore, even if Mobil had the right to receive dividends, the par-
ties timed the transaction so precisely to avoid having to deal with that problem.
85. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 195 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989)(quoting Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987)). See B.
BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 5, 14.51, at 14-175.
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The Esmark court acknowledged that Mobil's tender offer was
merely a part of an overall plan; neither Esmark nor the Service dis-
puted this characterization. However, "[t]he existence of an overall
plan does not alone... justify application of the step-transaction doc-
trine."8 6 Whether invoked under the binding commitment,87 end-re-
sult,88 or interdependence 9 tests, the doctrine "combines a series of
individually meaningless steps into a single transaction."90
The court addressed whether the Mobil-Esmark exchange in-
cluded any meaningless or unnecessary steps. If it did, the court could
collapse them together to honor the economic realities of the transac-
tion. The court, however, found no meaningless steps. Mobil's cash
tender offer was not a meaningless step because Mobil's stock owner-
ship was real and not transitory.
The court also analyzed Esmark's objectives and options in struc-
turing the transaction to determine whether any meaningless steps
were taken. Esmark had two objectives: disposing of its energy divi-
sion and redeeming approximately 54 percent of its stock. To accom-
plish these goals, Esmark had three alternatives available. First,
Esmark could have distributed Vickers stock to its shareholders in ex-
change for their shares; the shareholders then could have sold the
Vickers stock for cash to interested buyers.91 Second, Esmark could
have sold its Vickers stock for cash and then distributed the proceeds
to its shareholders in exchange for their stock.92 Using a third alter-
86. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 195 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989).
87. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968). See supm text accompanying notes
20-25. In Esmark, the binding commitment test was satisfied because Mobil and
Esmark reduced to writing Esmark's commitment to exchange Mobil's shares for
Vickers shares.
88. Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1429-30 (1987). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-29. In Esmark, the end-result test was met because Esmark was mo-
tivated largely by tax savings.
89. Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 124 (5th Cir. 1983). See
supra text accompanying notes 32-38. In Esmark, the various steps in Mobil's
purchase were mutually interdependent because Esmark would never have
agreed to have Mobil as a shareholder if it would assert the normal rights of a 54
percent shareholder.
90. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 195 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 195-96. Similar plans were used in United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv.
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950)(a closely held corporation distributed electric transmis-
sion and distribution equipment to its shareholders who in turn sold the equip-
ment to a willing cooperative) and Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S.
331 (1945) (closely held corporation made liquidating distribution to its two share-
holders who subsequently conveyed the apartment building to a purchaser).
92. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 196 (1988), affl'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989). This alternative, however, posed several problems; Mobil may not
have been the successful bidder, and a cash sale would result in Esmark being
taxed on the exchange of highly appreciated property.
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native, however, Mobil acquired Esmark stock in a cash tender offer
and immediately exchanged such stock for the Vickers stock.
After outlining the three routes that Esmark had available, the
court considered whether any one route was more direct than any
other. In other words, did any one route better explain the substance
of what occurred? If any one route was more direct, more consistent,
more complete, or more succinct, 93 the court could recast the transac-
tion to match its perceived substance. If, however, no single route was
preferred, the -court should honor the form chosen.
In Esmark, each alternative required two steps, and each step in-
volved two of the three interested parties. The first alternative re-
quired a distribution to shareholders followed by a cash sale to Mobil.
The second alternative required a stock sale to Mobil followed by a
distribution of the proceeds to its shareholders in exchange for Es-
mark stock. The third alternative required a stock purchase and a re-
demption of that stock for Vickers stock. Each alternative left
Esmark, its shareholders, and the purchaser in the same relative posi-
tions. Thus, the court concluded that no single route better explained
the substance of what occurred; neither the form used by Esmark nor
the other alternatives were preferred. Because the parties could have
completed the transaction in any of the three forms and still have
achieved the same economic result, Esmark was entitled to choose the
path that resulted in the least tax.94
Additionally, the Service's recharacterization of the Mobil-Esmark
exchange sought not only to combine steps, but to invent new ones.95
By characterizing the transaction as a sale of Vickers to Mobil fol-
lowed by a self-tender, the Service attempted to create steps not taken
under the tender offer/redemption format.
Inventing new steps, however, is not generally appropriate in the
application of the step-transaction doctrine. In Grove v. Commis-
sioner,96 for example, a taxpayer donated stock in his construction
company to his alma mater. The taxpayer's gift contained four condi-
93. Levmore, supra note 5, at 1020.
94. In terms of the table listing the six types of situations in which form versus sub-
stance arguments arise, see supra note 43, Esmark represents the third type with
only one minor modification. There were three substance alternatives rather
than two. In determining whether all three forms achieved the same economic
result, the amount of tax savings in using the third alternative as opposed to the
other two is not included. The focus here is on what properties were transferred
and to whom.
95. According to the Service, however, its characterization did combine formally sep-
arate steps. The Service argued the transaction was in fact a purchase by Mobil of
Vickers stock from Esmark (one transaction) rather than a purchase of Esmark
stock by Mobil followed by redemption of the Esmark stock (two transactions).
That characterization, however, fell on deaf ears in the Tax Court litigation. Es-
mark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
96. 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973).
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tions: (1) the corporation could not agree to any obligation to redeem
shares held by the donee; (2) if the donee disposed of the shares, any
proceeds had to be invested and managed by an established profes-
sional firm; (3) the donor, or his wife if she survived him, retained an
interest in the income from the gift for life; and (4) the donee agreed
to give the corporation the right of first refusal in purchasing the
shares. Grove made similar donations over the next thirteen years.
The corporation typically redeemed the donee's shares one year after
the donation.
The Service, however, viewed the transaction differently. It recast
the transaction as a redemption of Grove's, not the donee's shares, fol-
lowed by a cash gift to the donee9 In rejecting the Service's
recharacterization, the Court stated:
We are not so naive as to believe that tax considerations played no role in
Grove's planning. But foresight and planning do not transform a non-taxable
event into one that is taxable. Were we to adopt the Commissioner's view, we
would be required to recast two actual transactions - a gift by Grove to ...
[donee] and a redemption from... [donee] by the Corporation -into two com-
pletely fictional transactions - a redemption from Grove by the Corporation
and a gift by Grove to... [donee]. [W]e can discover no basis for elevating the
Commissioner's "form" over that employed by the taxpayer in good faith.
"Useful as the step transaction may be in the interpretation of equivocal con-
tracts and ambiguous events, it cannot generate events which never took place
just so an additional tax liability might be asserted."98
Recognizing that inventing new steps would be improper, the Es-
mark court refused to apply the step-transaction doctrine. The Mobil-
Esmark exchange involved no meaningless or unnecessary steps.
Each step had independent economic significance, creating substantial
rights and liabilities that could not be ignored. Application of the step-
transaction doctrine to the Mobil-Esmark exchange would not only
have combined steps, but would have invented new fictional steps.
IV. MOBIL-ESMARK TYPE TRANSACTIONS AND
SECTION 355
In 1980, Esmark completed its transaction with Mobil, relying on
Section 311(d) (2) (B) to provide nonrecognition treatment. Subse-
quent congressional amendments have preempted much of the crea-
tive tax planning that led to the enactment of Section 311(d).
Consequently, many may wonder whether tax-free Mobil-Esmark
type transactions have been statutorily eliminated. Taxpayers seeking
to structure Mobil-Esmark type transactions may still have one possi-
97. Under the Service's characterization, the redemption proceeds would be taxable
as ordinary income to Grove. Under the taxpayer's view, amounts paid by the
corporation to redeem the donated shares from the school were not taxed upon
distribution. Id. at 246.
98. Id. at 247-48 (quoting Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
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bility available. A Mobil-Esmark type transaction might qualify as a
nontaxable "split-off"99 to which Section 355 of the Code applies. In
order to determine whether a transaction qualifies as a Section 355
split-off, one must examine the statutory and judicial requirements
for a split-off, especially in light of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine.100 Only after a proper statutory foundation is laid may one
determine whether a Mobil-Esmark type transaction qualifies for such
nonrecognition treatment.
A. Section 355 Requirements
1. Statutory Requirements
Section 355 of the CodelOl generally permits the tax-free distribu-
99. A split-off refers to an exchange of the stock of a controlled corporation with
some or all shareholders for some or all of their stock of the distributing corpora-
tion; such an exchange may be pro rata among the shareholders. B. BrrTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 5, 13.01; Walter, Spin-offt, Split-offs and Split-ups in Two
Step Acquisitions and Dispositions, 66 TAXES 970, 972 (1988).
100. The General Utilities doctrine is named after General Utilities & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). This doctrine was later codified in Sections 311
and 336 of the 1954 Code. Before the amendments in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the General Utilities doctrine allowed corporations to distribute appreciated as-
sets without recognition of gain in certain circumstances. The 1986 amendments,
however, provide that nearly all distributions of appreciated assets will trigger
corporate level gain recognition. The recognition provisions in Section 311(b)
nearly swallow the nonrecognition rule in Section 311(a).
101. I.R.C. § 355 (1990). That section, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Effect on Distributees.
(1) General Rule. If -(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the distributing
corporation") -(i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to his stock,...
solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred to in this sec-
tion as "controlled corporation") which it controls immediately
before the distribution,
(B) the transaction was not used principally as a device for the
distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing corpo-
ration or the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact
that subsequent to the distribution stock or securities in one or
more of such corporations are sold or exchanged by all or some
of the distributees (other than pursuant to an arrangement nego-
tiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be con-
strued to mean that the transaction was used principally as such
a device),(C) the requirements of subsection (b)(relating to active busi-
nesses) are satisfied, and
(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation dis-
tributes -
(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corpora-
tion held by it immediately before the distribution, or
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation consti-
tuting control within the meaning of section 368(c)...
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount shall be in-
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tion by one corporation (the distributing corporation) of stock or se-
curities in another corporation (the controlled corporation) to
shareholders with respect to their stock102 or security holders in ex-
change for their securities,103 provided that the distribution is not
principally a device for distributing earnings and profits'0 4 to share-
holders.105 Although Section 355 is directed to the tax treatment of
the distributee shareholders in certain corporate divisions, the repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine and the inversion of the tax rates
have switched the focus from the tax treatment of the distributee
shareholders to the distributing corporation. Because Section 355 per-
mits nonrecognition treatment to shareholders in transactions that fit
its requirements, the section is a powerful tool for creative tax plan-
ners in avoiding the dire consequences of General Utilities repeal.
Section 355 expressly requires that four conditions be satisfied for
non-recognition treatment. First, a corporation must distribute stock
of a subsidiary which the distributing corporation controlled immedi-
ately prior to the distribution to a shareholder with respect to his
stock. Second, either all of the stock of the subsidiary must be distrib-
cludible in the income of) such shareholder... on the receipt of such
stock.
102. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 913
(1981)(distribution not with respect to stock because some stock rights were exer-
cised by persons who were not stockholders of the distributing corporation);
Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967)(transfer of stock of trans-
feror's subsidiary to transferor's shareholders on their exercise of stock rights
held as not being a distribution by transferor with respect to its stock); cf. Rev.
Rul. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68 (upstream sale of stock of second-tier subsidiary, fol-
lowed by an immediate cash dividend to parent corporation disregarded and
transaction held in substance a Section 355 distribution of stock).
103. Rev. RuL 76-175,1976-1 C.B. 92; Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166. If the distribu-
tion is not made with respect to its stock or stock and securities, the transaction
will be characterized by that status. See, ag., Rev. Rul 77-20, 1977-1 C.B. 91 (ex-
cess of value of distributed stock over value of stock surrendered by shareholder-
landlord constituted rent owed by distributing corporation to shareholder).
104. Although there is no comprehensive definition of the term "earnings and profits"
in the Code or regulations, Section 312 of the Code contains numerous rules for
determining the effect of particular transactions on the computation of earnings
and profits. In most cases, earnings and profits corresponds to the earned surplus
account representing the amount of retained profits from operation, and reflect-
ing nonoperating profits and losses. Fed. Taxes 2d (P-H) % 17.343 (1988). In other
cases, the earned surplus amount will differ from the amount of earnings and
profits for tax purposes due to the effect of Section 312 of the Code. Id.
105. Under Section 311(a), as amended in 1986, a distributing corporation does not rec-
ognize gain or loss on a nonliquidating distribution of property with respect to its
stock. The Section 311(a) nonrecognition rule is limited by Section 311(b)(1) with
respect to gain for distributions to which subpart A (I.R.C. §§ 301-307) applies.
Because Section 355 is not within the scope of the Section 311(b)(1) limitation, the
general nonrecognition rule of Section 311(a) applies to spin-offs (an analog to
dividends) and split-offs (an analog to nonliquidating redemptions) under Section
355. B. BrrTKER & J. EusTIC, suprm note 5, 13.12, at 13-44.
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uted or an amount of stock constituting control (within the meaning of
Section 368(c))106 must be distributed, and the distributing corporation
must establish that the retention of the nondistributed stock was not
for tax avoidance purposes.107 Third, the transaction must not be used
principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits.108
Fourth, both the distributing corporation and the controlled corpora-
tion must have been engaged in an active trade or business for five
years before the date of the distribution.109
2. Continuity of Interest Test
Besides the express requirements of Section 355, a two-step trans-
action must satisfy the continuity of interest requirement in order to
qualify under the section. There are generally two possible sources
for the continuity of interest requirement: Section 368 of the Code,110
if a Section 355 transaction is viewed as a reorganization; or the device
clause in Section 355 itself."' Currently tax theorists and commenta-
tors view the continuity of interest requirement as a useful protection
106. I.R.C. § 368(c) generally requires that the distributing corporation own at least 80
percent of the total combined voting power and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the controlled corporation.
107. Under Section 355(a)(2), the distribution need not be pro-rata to the
shareholders.
108. The device clause normally prohibits the distributee in a spin-off from immedi-
ately reselling the spun-off stock pursuant to a plan. The device clause, however,
is premised on a significant difference between the rates on ordinary income and
capital gains. Because there is largely no difference between ordinary income
and capital gains treatment currently, the importance of the device clause as a
defense against an earnings and profits bailout is significantly diminished. See
Walter, supra note 99, at 971; Simon & Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40
TAX NoTEs 291, 293 (July 18, 1988).
109. I.R.C. § 355 (1990); B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 13.03 at 13-9; Walter,
supra note 99, at 971; Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquiations (and Related Matters)
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986,42 TAX L. REv. 575, 597 n.99 (1987)(discussing
split-ups). For the text of Section 355, see supra note 101.
110. Walter, supra note 99, at 973. Viewing a Section 355 transaction as a reorganiza-
tion, however, may be problematic. A Section 355 transaction need not be a reor-
ganization, and continuity of interest is not a requirement in all types of
reorganizations, such as recapitalizations under I.RLC. § 368(a)(1)(E)(1982), see
Rev. Rul. 77-415,1977-2 C.B. § 111; Rev. Rul. 77-479,1977-2 C.B. 119, and distribu-
tions under former I.R.C. § 311(d)(repealed 1986), see supra note 55. Typically,
two-step transactions under Section 355 closely resemble a recapitalization: beth
involve the reshuffling of an existing business or businesses without the injection
of assets or operations from another corporation. Walter, supra note 99, at 973.
See also Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1942).
111. Walter, supra note 99, at 973; Sheppard, Section 355 and Continuity of Interest, 39
TAX NOTEs 911, 912 (May 23, 1988). The device clause in Section 355 arguably
does not support a continuity of interest requirement because the device clause
was designed to protect against corporations bailing out earnings at capital gains
rates. B. BI2rKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 5, 13.02[2]-[3]. Capital gains prefer-
ence, however, has been eliminated from the Code.
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against an end-run around the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine."2 In existing regulations, the Service has indicated that:
Section 355 applies to a separation that affects only readjustment of continu-
ing interests in the property of the distributing and controlled corporations.
In this regard section 355 requires that one or more persons who, directly or
indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution or ex-
change own, in the aggregate, an amount of stock establishing a continuity of
interest in each of the modified corporate forms in which the enterprise is
conducted after the separation.1 13
Thus, the Service has granted nonrecognition treatment to Section 355
spin-offs based on the fact that the shareholder's interest in the under-
lying assets remains in corporate solution, albeit in different percent-
ages and in a different form.
To ensure that the shareholder's interest remains in corporate so-
lution, the Service prohibits immediate sale of the subsidiary stock,
relying on the restrictions in the device clause.n4 Additionally, under
the 1988 amendments to Section 355,115 a corporation which acquires
control of the distributing corporation must be engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business for a period of five years from the date it
received the parent's stock in a taxable transaction. Thus, the distrib-
utee corporation which acquires control of the target corporation must
hold the target stock for five years before the Section 355 transaction
in order to satisfy the continuity of interest requirement.
If, however, the distributing corporation does not acquire control of
the target corporation in a taxable transaction, the issue becomes
whether a similar five-year holding period applies. Prior to 1990, as a
general rule, the purchaser must wait approximately two years before
"spinning off" a controlled subsidiary.116
112. Walter, supra note 99, at 975. See also Simon & Simmons, supra note 108. The
Treasury currently is drafting regulations pursuant to its authority under Section
337(d) of the Code to prevent end-runs around General Utilities repeal.
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1)(1990).
114. Id. at § 1.355-2(d)(1).
115. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(k),
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnum. NEws (102 Stat.) 3605 (codified at I.PC.
§ 355(b)(2)(D)).
116. Sheppard, Spin Cycle" Whither Section 355?, 38 TAx NOTES 109, 109 (Jan. 11,
1988). A shareholder with two years of stock ownership in the distributing corpo-
ration prior to the Section 355 exchange was considered a historic shareholder for
continuity of interest purposes. Schler, Avoiding the Technical Requirements of
New Section 355,38 TAx NoTEs 417, 417 (Jan. 25, 1988).
In certain circumstances prior to 1990, the distributing corporation may not
have waited two years before receiving stock in the targets subsidiary in a Sec-
tion 355 exchange. The statute only required a holding period in case of a control-
ling interest in the target corporation. Prior to the 1990 amendments, the
distributee could purchase stock in a target and immediately effectuate a Section
355 spin-off or split-off of the desired subsidiary. For example, a purchaser could
acquire approximately 60 percent of the target corporation stock, with no change
in the remaining shareholders, and be immediately redeemed out without violat-
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In 1990, Congress addressed whether a holding period of less than
five years is sufficient in situations involving a less than controlling
interest in the target. In amending Section 355(d),f7 Congress statu-
torily requires a holding period of at least five years if immediately
ing the literal requirements of Section 355. Id. But cf. Sheppard, supra, at Ill
("In th[at] case it is hard to see how the corporation making the distribution can
argue a business purpose for doing so, even if satiating a raider holds up as a
business purpose.... It is likewise difficult to see how the investor can argue that
the distribution is not a device for avoiding dividend treatment.").
117. The 1990 revisions were part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11321(c), 1991 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (104 Stat.) 1162
(to be codified at I.R.C. § 355(d)). Section 355(d), in pertinent part, provides:
(d) Recognition of Gain on Certain Distributions of Stock or Securities
in Controlled Corporation. -
(1) In general. In the case of a disqualified distribution, any stock or
securities in the controlled corporation shall not be treated as quali-
fied property for purposes of subsection (c)(2) of this section or sec-
tion 361(c)(2).
(2) Disqualified distribution.-For purposes of this subsection, the
term "disqualified distribution" means any distribution to which this
section (or so much of section 356 as relates to this section) applies if,
immediately after the distribution-
(A) any person holds disqualified stock in the distributing cor-
poration which constitutes a 50-percent or greater interest in
such corporation, or(B) any person holds disqualified stock in the controlled corpo-
ration (or, if stock of more than 1 controlled corporation is dis-
tributed, in any controlled corporation) which constitutes a 50-
percent or greater interest in such corporation.
(3) Disqualified stock.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"disqualified stock" means-
(A) any stock in the distributing corporation acquired by
purchase after October 9,1990, and during the 5-year period end-
ing on the date of the distribution, and
(B) any stock in any controlled corporation-
(i) acquired by purchase after October 9, 1990, and during
the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution, or
(ii) received in the distribution to the extent attributable to
distributions on-
(I) stock described in subparagraph (A), or
(H) any securities in the distributing corporation ac-
quired by purchase after October 9,1990, and during the
5-year period ending on the date of the distribution.(4) 50-Percent or greater interest-For purposes of this subsection,
the term "50-percent or greater interest" means stock possessing at
least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock.
(5) Purchase.-For purposes of this subsection-(A) In general-Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
the term "purchase" means any acquisition but only if-
(i) the basis of the property acquired in the hands of the
acquirer is not determined (I) in whole or in part by refer-
ence to the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of
the person from whom acquired, or (H) under section
1014(a), and
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after the distribution a shareholder holds a 50 percent or greater inter-
(ii) the property is not acquired in an exchange to which
section 351, 354, 355, or 356 applies.
(B) Certain section 351 exchanges treated as purchases-The
term "purchase" includes any acquisition of property in an ex-
change to which section 351 applies to the extent such property
is acquired in exchange for-
(i) any cash or cash item.
(ii) any marketable stock or security, or
(iii) any debt of the transferor.
(C) Carryover basis transactions.-If-
(i) any person acquires property from another person who
acquired such property by purchase (as determined under
this paragraph with regard to this subparagraph), and
(ii) the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of such
acquirer is determined in whole or in part by reference to
the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of such
other person.
such acquirer shall be treated as having acquired such property by
purchase on the date it was so acquired by such other person.
(6) Special rule where substantial diminution of risk.-
(A) In general-If this paragraph applies to any stock or securi-
ties for any period, the running of any 5-year period set forth in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3)(whichever applies)
shall be suspended during such period.
(B) Property to which suspension applies.-This paragraph ap-
plies to any stock or securities for any period during which the
holder's risk of loss with respect to such stock or securities, or
with respect to any portion of the activities of the corporation, is
(directly or indirectly) substantially diminished by-
(i) an option,
(ii) a sale,
(iii) any special class of stock, or
(iv) any other device or transaction.
(7) Aggregation rules.-
(A) In general.-For purposes of this subsection, a person and
all persons related to such person (within the meaning of 267(b)
or 707(b)(1)) shall be treated as one person.
(B) Persons acting pursuant to plans or arrangements.-If two
or more persons act pursuant to a plan or arrangement with re-
spect to acquisitions of stock or securities in the distributing cor-
poration or controlled corporation, such person shall be treated
as one person for purposes of this subsection.
(8) Attribution from entities.-
(A) In general.-Paragraph (2) of section 318(a) shall apply in
determining whether a person holds stock or securities in any
corporation (determined by substituting "10 percent" for "50
percent" in subparagraph (C) of such paragraph (2) and by treat-
ing any reference to stock as including a reference to securities).
(B) Deemed purchase rule.-If-
(i) any person acquires by purchase any interest in any en-
tity, and
(ii) such person is treated under subparagraph (A) as hold-
ing any stock or securities by reason of holding such
interests,
such stock or securities shall be treated as acquired by purchase by such
person on the later of the date of the purchase of the interest in such
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est in the distributing corporation or a distributed subsidiary that is
attributable to stock or securities that were acquired by purchase
within the preceding five-year period.l18 Section 355(d)(6) suspends
the five-year holding period whenever the holder's risk of loss with
respect to such stock or securities, or with respect to any portion of the
activities of the corporation, is (directly or indirectly) substantially di-
minished by an option, a short sale, any special class of stock (the so-
called alphabet stock), or any other device or transaction.
3. Business Purpose Test
Additionally, there must be a valid business purpose, other than
tax avoidance, for both the distribution of the controlled corporation
stock to the distributee shareholders and the separation of the busi-
nesses.11 9 Since Gregory v. Helvering,2 0 both the Service and the
courts have applied this concept in a rigorous manner, fearing that the
corporation could use Section 355 to bail out earnings. To protect
against a Gregory-type bailout, the regulations under Section 355 pro-
vide that a distribution will not meet the business purpose test if the
business purpose can be achieved by another nontaxable transaction
that does not involve a distribution of stock of a controlled corporation
"and which is neither impractical nor unduly expensive."'12 1 The cases
and regulations provide examples illustrating the requirement that
there be a business purpose for the distribution as well as for the sepa-
ration of the businesses. Although the Service requires that there
must be a corporate business purpose and that a shareholder purpose
will not suffice,12 2 the courts' position may be unclear. 2 3 Recent ex-
amples of valid corporate business purposes include: (1) enhancing a
entity or the date such stock or securities are acquired by purchase by
such entity.
118. The 50 percent or greater interest test in Section 355(d) means stock or securities
possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of all shares of all
classes of stock. I.R.C. § 355(d)(4). Whether disqualified stock constitutes a 50-
percent or greater interest is determined immediately following the distribution
of stock (whether to that shareholder, or to other shareholders). In applying the
50-percent or greater test, all stock that the shareholder (including related par-
ties) acquires after the effective date of the provision by purchase (or that is at-
tributable to distributions on stock or securities acquired after the effective date
by purchase), as that term is defined for purposes of this provision, is taken into
consideration. Fed. Taxes 2d (P-H) 3551, at 25,162-E (1990).
119. This requirement is reflected in the regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3)(1990);
the rulings, Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 C.B. 51; and the cases, see, e.g., Bonsale v.
Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963); Gada v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 859
(D. Conn. 1978).
120. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3)(1990).
122. Treas. Regs. § 1.355-2(b)(2)(1990). However, a shareholder purpose which is
"nearly coextensive with a corporate business purpose as to preclude any distinc-
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corporation's access to additional funds by borrowing or raising equity
capital; 2 4 (2) distributions to enable a key employee to acquire an eq-
uity interest in the operation of one or more of the corporation's busi-
nesses; 2 5 (3) facilitating a merger of the distributing or controlled
corporation; 2 6 and (4) reducing regulatory burdens. 7
Although the regulations provide that qualifying either the distrib-
uting corporation or controlled corporation to make a Subchapter S
election is not a proper business purpose presumably because the ob-
jective is tax avoidance,28 the regulations do not address whether pre-
serving an existing S election is a valid corporate business purpose.'2 9
B. Mobil-Esmark's Exchange: Section 355 Split-off?
Assuming that all relevant businesses have been conducted for five
years, that a valid business purpose for the exchange exists,130 and
that the parties can avoid the step-transaction doctrine, the Mobil-Es-
mark exchange may qualify as a tax-free split-off under Section 355.131
The critical issue is whether the formal exchange agreement whereby
Esmark was obligated to redeem Mobil's shares the same day as the
tender offer constitutes a prohibited device for the distribution of
earnings or, alternatively, a violation of the continuity of interest
requirement.
Under the factors listed in Revenue Ruling 83-38,132 the Service
would attack the exchange for its tax avoidance purposes. The Service
tion between them" will suffice. Id. The regulations unfortunately do not illus-
trate this principle with examples.
123. See Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962)(shareholder
purpose may justify a spin-off even when there is no corporate business purpose).
124. Rev. Rul. 85-122, 1985-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 82-130, 1982-2 C.B. 83.
125. Rev. Rul. 88-34, 1988-1 C.B. 115; Rev. Rul. 85-127, 1985-2 C.B. 119. The Service
generally requires that the employee acquire at least 5 percent of the subsidiary
stock. See Faber, Business Purpose and Section 355, 43 TAX LAWYER 855, 878-79
(1990).
126. E.g., King v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972); Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1
C.B. 89.
127. Rev. Rul. 88-33,1988-1 C B. 115.
128. Treas. Regs. § 1.355-2(b)(5)(Example 6)(1990).
129. The Service recently refused to rule in one situation involving a spin-off designed
to preserve an existing S election. Faber, supra note 125, at 881.
130. In Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171,192 (1988), qff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989), the court noted that the transaction served several important corpo-
rate, as well as shareholder, purposes. Esmark generated needed capital by sig-
nificantly contracting its businesses, and a significant percentage of shareholders
forever terminated their interests in the company.
131. If, however, Esmark flunks the requirements under Section 355, the corporation
would be forced to recognize gain on the transaction under Section 311(b). It
would have to recognize gain equal to the difference between its basis in the sub-
sidiary stock distributed and the fair market value of such stock.
132. 1983-1 C.B. 76.
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would allege that such tax avoidance purposes constitute a prohibited
device for the distribution of earnings. Furthermore, the Service
would contend that the existence of a formal exchange agreement vio-
lates the continuity of interest requirement; Mobil held Esmark for
less than a day which is substantially less than the five-year holding
period required by Section 355(d) for less than controlling interests.
Thus, Mobil in order to effectuate a Section 355 split-off would be re-
quired to hold its Esmark shares for at least five years.
Although a split-off is theoretically possible, it is important to con-
sider whether a split-off is a viable business option. If Mobil would
have been required to hold its Esmark stock for the full five years
before the Section 355 transaction occurred, the exchange may never
have proceeded. Esmark would never have consented to Mobil acquir-
ing 54 percent of Esmark shares if Mobil would have been able to ex-
ercise its majority shareholder rights for five years. Esmark would
have been held captive by Mobil's board of directors. Conversely, Mo-
bil would have been in an awkward position because it did not want to
buy into the management of a large holding company such as Esmark.
Mobil only wanted to acquire Vickers' assets in corporate solution.
Thus, a five-year marriage between Mobil and Esmark would have
been unacceptable to both parties.
In a smaller transaction, however, a five-year holding period may
not pose a complete barrier to the consummation of the transaction.
The distributing corporation may not be as sensitive to a new majority
shareholder, and the acquiring corporation may not be as reluctant to
assume majority shareholder duties for the five-year period. Thus, a
union of smaller corporations or, in the alternative, similarly sized
corporations on a smaller scale of ownership may make a better fit.
The distributing corporation may avoid the five-year holding pe-
riod in Section 355(d) by acquiring less than a 50-percent interest in
the target corporation. In those cases, a holding period of at least two
years may be sufficient in order to qualify for tax-free treatment
under Section 355.133
V. CONCLUSION
The Service and the courts repeatedly recharacterize certain tax-
payer maneuvers to honor the underlying economic reality of the
transaction. The step-transaction doctrine is a corollary of substance
versus form arguments. The doctrine will treat a series of formally
separate steps as a single transaction if such steps are in substance
integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a particular result.
The doctrine will combine steps, but it should never be used to invent
new steps.
133. See supra note 116.
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The court in Esmark correctly refused to apply the step-transac-
tion doctrine. Although the substantive result may at first blush seem
incorrect, the court's decision is theoretically sound. Whenever a
transaction satisfies the literal requirements of the Code and accepted
judicial doctrine, the statute must be given full force and effect, even
though that result may not have been contemplated by Congress or
the Treasury. In such a situation, the form of the transaction should
dictate the tax treatment. Otherwise, the value of certainty in the
"art" of tax planning, in Judge Cohen's words, is irretrievably lost.
Although the nonrecognition provision used in Esmark was elimi-
nated in 1986, Mobil-Esmark type transactions may qualify as a tax-
free split-off under Section 355 of the Code. In order to qualify under
Section 355, the acquiring corporation may be required to hold its
stock in the distributing corporation for at least five years. Such a
holding period may pose problems to both corporations.
Heartened by the spirit of the Esmark decision, tax practitioners
may offer creative tax planning opportunities to their corporate cli-
ents if the transaction complies with the literal requirements of the
Code. Perhaps Esmark represents the triumph of form over substance
if all the literal requirements of the Code are satisfied.
Joseph C. Vitek '89
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